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Consider the economy modeled by Shapley and Scarf [10] in which there is
a set of agents, each of whom has strict preferences over a set of indivisible
goods, for instance houses. In this economy, commonly known as “housing
market”, each agent is endowed with one house and they are allowed to exchange
their houses among themselves, although monetary transfers are not permitted.
In this seminal paper, Shapley and Scarf prove the existence of a nonempty
strict core in this economy by using a so-called Top Trading Cycles Algorithm
(hereafter, TTC), attributed to David Gale.
The housing market has been extensively analyzed in the literature under the
domain of strict preferences, becoming plain that the TTC mechanism satisﬁes
(very) desirable properties. Roth and Postlewaite [8] prove that this mechanism
results in the unique assignment which belongs to the strict core. Subsequently,
Roth [7] shows that it is a dominant strategy for agents to reveal their true pref-
erences. Furthermore, Ma [5] shows that the TTC mechanism, equivalent to the
strict core mechanism, is the only mechanism satisfying individual rationality,
Pareto-eﬃciency and strategy-proofness (in the domain of strict preferences).
Unlike the previous case, however, very few papers have been written on
housing market under the full preference domain, even though it seems to be
quite natural that agents may have indiﬀerences over goods. One reason might
be that introducing weak preferences to the model introduce also additional
complications. First, in this case, the strict core might be empty, unique or
multi-valued. Moreover, although the core is always nonempty, some of its al-
locations could be ineﬃcient. As far as we know, there are two papers dealing
with weak preferences. On the one hand, Quint and Wako [6] propose an al-
gorithm to calculate if the strict core is empty or not, and obtain a strict core
assignment if it is non-empty. However, this cannot be considered a mechanism
since, for housing markets with an empty strict core, it reports that the strict
core is empty but it does not give an allocation. On the other hand, Yilmaz [11]
presents a random mechanism satisfying individual rationality, ex-ante eﬃciency
and no justiﬁed-envy. However, this mechanism is not an strict core mechanism
(i.e., there are housing market problems with non-empty strict core in which
the mechanism do not select an strict core allocation). Additionally, it is not
a generalization of the TTC mechanism, since the allocation that it proposes
to problems with strict preferences may be diﬀerent from the unique strict core
allocation. Additionally, this mechanism does not satisfy strategy-proofness,
although it attains higher levels of eﬃciency (by the randomized nature of the
mechanism).
The contribution of this paper is to present a family of mechanisms that gen-
eralizes the TTC mechanism preserving their good properties when agents are
allowed to report indiﬀerences. In order to introduce this family of mechanisms,
1we deﬁne an algorithm called Top Trading Absorbing Sets algorithm (hereafter
TTAS), which results in a strict core allocation when this set is non-empty and,
otherwise, it results in a Pareto-eﬃcient core allocation. Then, we prove that
this family of mechanisms satisfy individual rationality, Pareto-eﬃciency and
strategy-proofness.
Additionally, we have that other problems involving indivisible goods and
where monetary transfers are not allowed have been considered so much in
the literature. Some examples are the housing allocation with existing tenants
(Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1]), the kidney exchange problem (Roth et al.
[9]) and the school choice problem (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [2]). In these
problems, the unique or one of the proposed solutions is based on an adaptation
of the TTC to these frameworks. However, as in the housing market problem,
they only study the case in which agents have strict preferences. Our family of
mechanisms (with the same particular adaptations needed to each framework)
will generalize all the classical mechanisms to the case in which agents can report
indiﬀerences.
The rest of the paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 con-
tains some basic preliminaries of the housing market problem. Section 3 revises
the TTC mechanism, introduces the family of TTAS mechanisms and studies
the properties of this family of mechanisms in the housing market problem. Sec-
tion 4 presents some further applications of our mechanisms to other problems.
Finally, an appendix contains the proofs of the results along the paper.
2 The housing market model
Let N be a ﬁnite set of agents and H be a set of houses such that |N| = |H| =
n. Each individual i ∈ N has a transitive and complete (but not necessarily
antisymmetric) preference binary relation Ri on H. As usual, we will denote
by Pi and Ii the symmetric part and the asymmetric part of Ri, respectively.
For any Ri and any S ⊆ H, we will deﬁne the maximal elements of S according
to Ri as the set max(Ri) = {x ∈ S | xRiy for all y ∈ S}. Deﬁne R = (Ri)i∈N.
Given i ∈ N, let R−i = (Rj)j∈N\{i} denote the preferences of all individuals
except i.
An assignment (or allocation) is a bijective map µ : N −→ H. In some
cases, we will denote the house that is assigned to individual i by µi instead
of µ(i). The assignment which describes the initial owners of the houses is
called “initial endowment” and is denoted by ω. For any T ⊆ N, we deﬁne
ω(T) = {x ∈ H | x = ωi for some i ∈ T}. Then, a housing market is a list
(N,H,ω,R).
A deterministic mechanism f is a map that assigns for each housing market
(N,H,ω,R) an assignment f(N,H,ω,R). When the description of (N,H,ω,R)
2is clear, we will denote the house assigned to individual i ∈ N by the mechanism
f as fi. Let F be the set of all deterministic mechanisms. A random mechanism
g is a probability distribution over F. That is, a random mechanism associates
for each housing market a probability distribution over the set of assignments.
Obviously, any deterministic mechanism is a random mechanism.
An assignment µ is individually rational if for each agent i ∈ N, µiRiωi. A
deterministic mechanism f is individually rational if it always selects an indi-
vidually rational assignment for each housing market. A random mechanism is
individually rational if its support contains only individually rational determin-
istic mechanisms.
An assignment µ is Pareto-eﬃcient if there does not exist any other as-
signment ν such that for all i ∈ N, νiRiµi and for some j ∈ N, νjPjµj. A
deterministic mechanism f is eﬃcient if it always selects a Pareto-eﬃcient as-
signment for each housing market. A random mechanism is ex-post eﬃcient if
its support contains only eﬃcient deterministic mechanisms. A random mecha-
nism g stochastically dominates other random mechanism h if for any possible
vector of utilities U = (ui)i∈N compatible with R, the following must hold: for
all i ∈ N,
P
x∈H p(gi(N,H,ω,R) = x)   ui(x) ≥
P
x∈H p(hi(N,H,ω,R) = x)   ui(x) and
there is some j ∈ N in which this inequality is strict.
Then, a random mechanism g is ex-ante eﬃcient if it is not stochastically
dominated by any other random mechanism.
A random mechanism g is strategy-proof if truth-telling is a dominant strat-
egy in its associated preference revelation game. That is, for any possible vector
of utilities U = (ui)i∈N compatible with R, the following must hold: for all
i ∈ N,
P
x∈H p(gi(N,H,ω,R) = x) ui(x) ≥
P
x∈H p(gi(N,H,ω,(R−i,R′
i)) = x) ui(x)
for all possible R′
i
An assignment µ is in the core of the housing market if there is no coalition
T ⊆ N and matching ν such that for all i ∈ T, νi ∈ ω(T) and νiPiµi. An
assignment µ is in the strict core of the housing market if there is no coalition
T ⊆ N and matching ν such that for all i ∈ T, νi ∈ ω(T) and νiRiµi and for
some j ∈ T, νjPjµj.
Preliminaries in digraphs
We begin with some background in the theory of directed graphs. A directed
graph, or digraph for short, is a pair (V,E), where V is a set of vertices (or
nodes) and E is a set of directed arcs. The indegree (outdegree) of a node
3vi ∈ V is the number of arcs that point to (part from) vi. Given two nodes
vi,vj ∈ V , we say that there is a path from vi to vj if there is a sequence of
nodes vi = v1,...,vm = vj such that for all i ∈ {1,..,m − 1}, there is an arc
from vi to vi+1. A cycle is an ordered set of nodes C = {v1,v2,...,vm} such
that for all i ∈ {1,...,m − 1}, there is an arc from vi to vi+1 and there is an
arc from vm to v1. Two nodes vi,vj ∈ V constitute a symmetric pair if there is
an arc from vi to vj and an arc from vj to vi.
An absorbing set is a set of nodes A that satisﬁes two conditions: (i) for any
two nodes vi,vj ∈ A, there is a path from one to the other (inside connection),
and (ii) there does not exist any path from any node vi ∈ A to any node vj  ∈ A
(no inside-outside connection). An absorbing set is paired-symmetric if each of
its nodes belongs to a symmetric pair.
3 Mechanisms
The classical framework in which the housing market problem is studied in the
literature consists of individuals having strict preferences. In this case, Shapley
and Scarf [10] have shown that the strict core always exists and have proposed
the Strict Core mechanism, which selects for each housing market a strict core
assignment.1 It has been shown (Roth [7]) that this deterministic mechanism
is strategy-proof. Moreover, Ma [5] shows that this is the unique mechanism
that satisﬁes individual rationality, Pareto-eﬃciency and strategy-proof in this
domain of strict preferences. Shapley and Scarf attributed to Gale an algorithm
called Top Trading Cycles to compute the strict core assignment of a housing
market.
Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
Consider a directed graph in which there are two types of nodes, agents and
houses, arcs are formed by agents pointing to houses and houses pointing to
agents, and all nodes have outdegree equal to 1. An interesting fact about any
directed graph with these characteristics is that it always has at least one cycle
and no two cycles intersect. This allows that the following algorithm, called
Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale and introduced by Shapley and
Scarf [10], always determines an assignment.
Gale´s top trading cycles (TTC) algorithm:
Step 1:
(1.1) Let each agent point to her maximal house and each house point to its
owner. Select the cycles of this graph.
1It has been proven by Roth and Postlewaite [8] that the strict core assignment is unique
for housing markets with strict preferences.
4(1.2) Their agents are removed from the algorithm by assigning each agent
the house she is pointing to.
Step i:
(i.1) Let each remaining agent point to her maximal house among the re-
maining ones and each remaining house point to its owner (note that when an
agent leaves, her original house also leaves; so a house remaining in the algo-
rithm implies that her owner is still in the algorithm and vice versa). Select the
cycles of this graph.
(i.2) Their agents are removed from the algorithm by assigning each agent
the house she is pointing to.
In the general case in which we admit indiﬀerences, the strict core may be
empty. There is an algorithm (called Top Trading Segmentation) proposed by
Quint and Wako [6] that determines if a housing market problem has an empty
core or not and, if it is non-empty, it determines an allocation of it. Given that
all the allocations of the strict core are indiﬀerent for all the individuals (i.e., if
µ and ρ belong to the strict core, µiIiρi for all i ∈ N), the case in which the
strict core is non-empty has a good solution by this algorithm. However, there
is not any satisfactory mechanism that serves for all housing market problems,
independently if it has or not a non-empty strict core. Normally, the mechanism
suggested in the literature to generalize the TTC mechanism (see the descrip-
tion for the case of indiﬀerences in Shapley and Scarf [10] or Roth [7]) is the
following:2 (1) Take the preferences of the individuals who have indiﬀerences
and convert them in strict orders by some (ﬁxed or random) tie-breakers; and
(2) apply the Top Trading Cycles mechanism.
Obviously, this class of mechanisms coincides with TTC for the case of strict
preferences. However, in the case of indiﬀerences, the application of these mech-
anisms does not lead necessarily to eﬃcient allocations. In fact, there are cases
in which these mechanisms never achieve an eﬃcient allocation, independently
of the tie-breakers selected. We illustrate this with a simple example.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3,4,5} and H = {h1,h2,h3,h4,h5} be the set of
agents and houses. Let ωi = hi for all i ∈ N be the initial endowment. The
preference proﬁle is the following:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
h2 h3 h4,h5 h1 h2
h1 h2 h3 h5 h4
h3 h1 h1 h4 h5
h4 h4 h2 h2 h1
h5 h5 h3 h3
2Yilmaz [11] proposes other mechanism, but it is not a generalization of the TTC mecha-
nism.
5In this housing market problem, the strict core is empty and the core contains






















5) = (h1,h3,h4,h5,h2). There is only one
indiﬀerence binary relation in the preference proﬁle and, then, there are two
possible results of the class of mechanisms presented before. They are exactly
µ1 and µ2. However, it is easy to see that each of these allocations are Pareto
dominated by µ3 and µ4, respectively.
Then, we have that (i) on the one hand, the TTC mechanism behaves well
for strict preferences, but the application of tie-breakers are not a good solution
for the general case; and (ii) on the other hand, the Top Trading Segmentation
algorithm provides a solution for some cases in the general case, but it is not a
mechanism in the sense that it does not provide any allocation when the strict
core is empty. In what follows, we propose a family of mechanisms (called Top
Trading Absorbing Sets) for the general case which extends TTC and TTS and
satisﬁes ex-post eﬃciency without renouncing to any of the good properties that
TTC satisﬁes.3
Top Trading Absorbing Sets Mechanisms
For the introduction of the algorithm that determines the family of mechanisms
presented below, we consider directed graphs in which there are two types of
nodes, agents and houses, arcs are formed by agents pointing to houses and
houses pointing to agents and all nodes have outdegree strictly positive. An
interesting characteristic of these digraphs is that they always have at least one
absorbing set (see Kalai and Schmeidler [4]).
Top trading absorbing sets (TTAS) algorithm:
Step 0: Consider a priority ranking of the houses; i. e., a complete, transi-
tive and antisymmetric binary relation over H.
Step 1:
(1.1) Let each agent point to her maximal houses and each house point to
its owner. Select the absorbing sets of this digraph.
(1.2) Consider the paired-simmetric absorbing sets. Their agents are re-
moved from the algorithm by assigning them their current assignments (Obvi-
ously, these houses are removed too).
(1.3) Consider the remaining absorbing sets. Select for each agent a unique
house to point to by using the following criterion: she point to the maximal
house with the highest priority diﬀerent from her current endowment.
(1.4) Then, in this subgraph, there is necessarily at least one cycle and no
two cycles intersect. Assign (temporarily) to each agent in these cycles the house
that she is pointing to, but maintain them in the algorithm.
3There could be other possible ex-post eﬃcient mechanisms that always select core alloca-
tions (and strict core allocations if there are). However, many of them are not strategy-proof.
6Step i:
(i.1) Let each remaining agent point to her maximal houses among the re-
maining ones. Select the absorbing sets of this digraph.
(i.2) Consider the paired-simmetric absorbing sets. Their agents are removed
from the algorithm by assigning them their current assignments (Obviously,
these houses are removed too).
(i.3) Consider the remaining absorbing sets. Select for each agent a unique
house to point to by using the following criterion: she point to the maximal
house with the highest priority from those that has not been assigned to her
yet.
(i.4) Then, in this subgraph, there is necessarily at least one cycle and no two
cycles intersect. Assign (temporarily) to each agent in these cycles the house
that she is pointing to, but maintain them in the algorithm.
The following example illustrates how the TTAS algorithm works for a par-
ticular housing market problem.
Example 2 Consider a housing market with N = {a1,a2,...,a9} and H =
{h1,h2,...,h9} and assume that the initial endowment of agent ai is the house
hi for all i ∈ {1,2,...,9}. Let the preference proﬁle R be the following (we only
express the houses that are not worse than the initial endowment of each agent):
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10




Consider the following priority ranking of houses:
h1 ≻ h2 ≻ h3 ≻ h4 ≻ h5 ≻ h6 ≻ h7 ≻ h8 ≻ h9
In what follows we depict the directed graphs that are formed in each step of the
algorithm: 4
4There are two colors for the arrows in each graph: the black ones, that reﬂect the arrows
that do not belong to an absorbing set; and the red ones, which are the ones that belong to
an absorbing set. Moreover, within the set of red arrows, there are two types: the dotted
arrows, which are the ones that in step (i.3) are not selected by the priority criterion ≻; and
the normal ones, that represent the arrows chosen by the priority criterion.
7Step 1:
  h9   a9






















h6   a6
 
h7   a7
There are two absorbing sets: A∗
1 = {a9,h9,a10,h10}, which is a paired-
symmetric one and, hence, it is removed by assigning h9 to a9 and h10 to a10.
The other absorbing set is A2 = {a7,h7,a6,h6}. In this case, the priority rank-
ing over houses is applied, and the cycle c2 = (a6,h7,a7,h6) is formed. Then,




























There is only one absorbing set: A∗
3 = {h6,a7}, which is paired-symmetric.





















  h8   a6
 
h7
There is a paired-symmetric absorbing set A∗
4 = {a6,h7}, which is removed
by assigning h7 to a6. There is also another absorbing set A5 = {a1,h1,a2,h2,a3,
h3,a4,h4,a5,h5}. By applying the priority ranking, the cycle c5 = (a1,h2,a2,h3,
a3,h4,a4,h1) is formed. Then, the algorithm assigns temporarily h2 to a1, h3


























8 = {a4,h1}, which are removed by assigning respectively h2 to a1, h3 to











There is only one absorbing set A∗
9 = {a3,h4,a5,h5}. In this case, the cycle
c9 = (a3,h5,a5,h4) is obtained by applying the priority ranking. Then, the











There is a paired-symmetric absorbing set A∗
10 = {a5,h4} that the algorithm





h5   a8
  h8
There is a paired-symmetric absorbing set A∗
11 = {a3,h5} that the algorithm




There is a paired-symmetric absorbing set A∗
11 = {a8,h8} that the algorithm
removes by assigning h8 to a8.
Meanwhile in the description of the TTC is clear that the algorithm always
determines an allocation, it is not so clear that this occurs with the TTAS. The
following proposition shows it.
Proposition 1 The TTAS algorithm always selects an allocation.
It is easy to see that in the case in which all individuals have strict prefer-
ences, all absorbing sets that appear in any step i of the algorithm are cycles
and, when the trading between the agents in each cycle is done, each of them
forms a paired-symmetric absorbing set with her new house in step i + 1 and
leaves the algorithm. As a consequence, the TTAS coincides with the TTC
when the preferences are strict.
The Top Trading Absorbing Sets Algorithm determines an allocation de-
pending on the priority ranking ≻ selected in the Step 0. Then, we deﬁne a
mechanism for each priority ranking in the following way: a mechanism µ is
a Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanism if there exists a priority ranking ≻
such that the mechanism chooses for each housing market problem the alloca-
tion that the Top Trading Absorbing Sets algorithm selects with this priority
ranking. The selection of the priority ranking is important only in the case in
which the strict core is empty, given that in the rest of cases it does not aﬀect the
welfare level that each individual attains. However, if the strict core is empty,
the priority ranking indicates the individuals that, in case of conﬂict, have to be
treated better than others (but always mantaining the eﬃciency of the mech-
anism and the fact that the allocation must be in the core of the problem).
Although the priority ranking is written in terms of houses for the simplicity of
the algorithm, its interpretation in terms of agents is easy: one individual i has
priority over other j if the original house of i, ω(i), has priority over ω(j).
We will prove ﬁrst that this class of mechanisms always selects an assignment
in the core.
11Theorem 2 With any priority ranking ≻, the TTAS≻ mechanism always se-
lects an assignment in the core.
As a corollary, we can deduce that all TTAS mechanisms satisfy Individual
Rationality.
Corollary 3 With any priority ranking ≻, the TTAS≻ mechanism is individ-
ually rational.
Now, we prove that TTAS maintains for the general case all the properties
that characterize the TTC for the restricted case of strict preferences. We start
with Pareto eﬃciency.
Theorem 4 With any priority ranking ≻, the TTAS≻ mechanism is Pareto-
eﬃcient.
Additionally, we also prove that any mechanism of our family is strategy-
proof.
Theorem 5 With any priority ranking ≻, the TTAS≻ mechanism is strategy-
proof.
Then, we have proved that, meanwhile in the restricted case of strict prefer-
ences the TTC mechanism is the only one that satisﬁes individual rationality,
ex-post eﬃciency and strategy-proofness (see Ma [5]), in the general case we
have a family of mechanisms that satisfy all these properties. Additionally, we
are going to prove that our family of mechanisms always select an strict core
allocation if the strict core is non-empty. That is, our family of mechanisms
always generalizes the solution of Quint and Wako [6].
Theorem 6 With any priority ranking ≻, the TTAS≻ mechanism selects an
strict core allocation when the strict core is non-empty.
4 Comments and Applications
We have proposed a family of deterministic mechanisms for the housing mar-
ket problems for the general case in which individuals can report indiﬀerences.
This family of mechanisms generalizes the previous proposals of the TTC mech-
anism and the TTS algorithm, satisfying all the desirable properties that these
proposals have. The mechanisms of the family diﬀer in the priority ranking im-
plemented to favor some individuals over others in case of conﬂict, but always
without renouncing to the requirements of eﬃciency, strategy-proofness and the
obligation of selecting a core allocation.
The selection of the priority ranking may be done in terms of some charac-
teristic of the individuals that are not included in the formal speciﬁcation of the
housing market problem (income, seniority, ...). However, if there is not any
12intuitive way of selecting a priority ranking in a particular problem, it is always
possible to randomize it. In this case, independently of the probability distribu-
tion over the priority rankings, we have that the random mechanism obtained
satisﬁes individual rationality, strategy-proofness and ex-post eﬃciency5. Ad-
ditionally, it selects a strict core allocation with probability 1 if the strict core
is non-empty and, in general, it selects a core allocation with probability 1.
There are many other problems in the literature that can be seen as a ex-
change of indivisible goods: house allocation with existing tennants (Abdulka-
diroglu and Sonmez [1]), kidney exchange (Roth et al. [9]), school choice (Ab-
dulkadiroglu and Sonmez [2]). In all these problems, the proposed solution,
maintaining the assumption that individuals can only report strict preferences,
is based on adaptations of the TTC algorithm to these particular cases.6 In
these problems, it is also natural that individuals could have indiﬀerences and,
then, it is also necessary to propose a mechanism for the general case in which
they can report them. We can easily adapt our family of Top Trading Absorbing
Sets mechanisms to each of these problems in a similar way that the original
TTC is adapted to incorporate the particular characteristics of each of these
frameworks.7 Therefore, the family of mechanisms that we propose has a wide
range of problems in which they can be applied.
APPENDIX
We are going to prove all the results of the paper in the Appendix.
Proof of proposition 1
By contradiction, suppose that this does not occur. That is, there is a maximal
set of individuals S ⊆ N and a maximal set of houses T ⊆ H that are not
removed never from the algorithm. Consider the algorithm just after the other
agents and houses has been removed (suppose that this occurs in step i). Then,
in this subgraph we know that there is at least one absorbing set. If at least
one absorbing set is paired-symmetric, we have a contradiction. If, however, all
absorbing sets are non paired-symmetric, we have that in each absorbing set
Ai, there exist a set of nodes Bi ⊆ Ai that do not belong to symmetric pairs.
Then, we proceed with step (i.3) and we select one house for each individual to
point using the priority ranking. Then, we go to step (i.4) and we proceed with
the provisional trading of the houses in the cycles. The nodes of Ai \ Bi will
also belong to symmetric pairs in the next period. With respect to each node
vi ∈ Bi, if it is in a cycle, it will belong to a symmetric pair in the next period.
5This is a diﬀerence with respect to the mechanism of Yilmaz [11], which is ex-ante eﬃcient.
6There is an exception in the school choice problem in which apart from the solution based
in the TTC, Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [2]) also propose other mechanism based on the
Gale-Shapley [3] deferred acceptance algorithm, which is the one that some authorities in US
cities have selected to be applied.
7The particular details of the adaptations can be provided upon request.
13Similarly, if there is no node of Bi in any cycle, it is easy to see that in the next
period Ai is also an absorbing set.
Then, the set of nodes that belong to symmetric pairs are never decreasing.
If they are increasing in some moments, we know that we will ﬁnally obtain a
paired-symmetric absorbing set and, therefore, some agents and houses leave
the algorithm and we arrive at a contradiction. Then, the unique possibility
is that the set of agents Bi do not enter never in a cycle. However, we have
seen that in this case the absorbing set Ai will stay stable over time. Given
that any node of an absorbing set belongs to some cycle and that the selection
of the house that each individual points to varies according to the rule of step
(i.3), we can deduce that some node of Bi will ﬁnally enter in a selected cycle.
Therefore, we have a contradiction and the proposition is proved.
Proof of Theorem 2
By contradiction, let µ be the assignment selected by applying the TTAS al-
gorithm with priority ordering ≻ to some housing market problem (N,H,ω,R)
and assume that µ is not in the core. Then, there exists a coalition T ⊆ N and
an assignment υ such that for all i ∈ T, υi ∈ ω(T) and υiPiµi. Denote, without
loss of generality, T = {1,2,...,r} such that υi = ωi+1 for all i ∈ {1,...,r −1}
and υr = ω1. Take 1 ∈ T. Given that υ1P1µ1, we have that υ1 have leaved
the algorithm before 1. Then, ω−1(υ1) = 2 ∈ T has entered in a cycle and has
received a temporary assignment before 1. Moreover, 2 prefers υ2 to µ2 and this
means that υ2 have leaved the algorithm before 2. Then, ω−1(υ2) = 3 ∈ T has
entered in a cycle and has received a temporary assignment before 2. Following
this argument, we have that for all i ∈ {1,...,r − 1}, i + 1 has entered in a
cycle and has received a temporary assignment before i and, therefore, r has
entered in a cycle and has received a temporary assignment before 1. However,
given that an individual and her initial endowment enters in a cycle by the ﬁrst
time in the same step, ω1 is in the algorithm when r enters ﬁrstly in a cycle.
Then, the house that r receives temporarily is not worse than υr = ω1. Then,
by Lemma 3, we can conclude that µrRrυr, which is a contradiction. Then, the
proposition is proved.
Proof of Theorem 4
By contradiction, suppose that there is some TTAS mechanism that selects for
some housing market problem (N,H,ω,R) an assignment µ which is not Pareto
eﬃcient. That is, there exists an assignment ν such that for all i ∈ N, νiRiµi
and for some j ∈ N, νjPjµj. Given the construction of the algorithm, νj has
leaved the algorithm with the agent µ−1(νj) before µj. This indicates that
µ−1(νj) has belonged to a paired-symmetric absorbing set A in this moment.
Given that µ−1(νj) should obtain by ν a house that is at least equally good
from her than νj, we have that at least one agent z of A (probably µ−1(νj))
have obtained by ν a house νz that have leaved the algorithm before z.
14We can replicate the analysis with the agent µ−1(νz). This agent should have
leaved the algorithm with a paired-symmetric absorbing set. Then, at least one
agent w of this absorbing set have obtained by ν a house νw that have leaved
the algorithm before w. However, this process can not be repeated inﬁnitely:
if we return continuously to symmetric absorbing sets that have leaved before,
we will arrive at the ﬁrst paired-symmetric absorbing set and it is impossible to
return more. Therefore, we have a contradiction and the proposition is proved.
Proof of Theorem 5
We are going to prove some lemmas that will help us in the proof of the theorem.
The ﬁrst lemma states that all the houses that the TTAS algorithm assigns
temporarily to an agent are indiﬀerent to her.
Lemma 1 Let xt
i be the t-th temporary assignment that the TTAS algorithm




Proof. Consider the step of the algorithm in which x
t+1
i is assigned to agent i
and let xt
i be agent i’s current assignment. Then, by construction of the algo-
rithm, there is a cycle in which xt










Now consider the step of the algorithm in which xt
i was assigned to i. At
this step, there was a cycle in which i points to xt
i and ,by construction, xt
i is
maximal for i among the remaining houses. But in this step, house x
t+1
i is still














Then, we can deduce the following corollary, by which the ﬁrst house that
the TTAS algorithm assigns temporarily to an agent determines the utility that
this agent will have with her ﬁnal assignment.
Corollary 7 Let x and µi be the ﬁrst temporary assignment and the ﬁnal as-
signment that the TTAS algorithm assigns to agent i, respectively. Then xIiµi.
The following lemma will also help us in the proof of the theorem. We will
denote hereafter by ϕ≻(P−i,Pi) the TTAS mechanism with the priority ranking
≻ when the reported preferences are (P−i,Pi) and the description of N, H and
ω is clear.
Lemma 2 Let hk be the ﬁrst house assigned temporarily to agent ai by the
TTAS algorithm for (P−i,Pi) with priority ranking ≻ and let P ′
i be any prefer-
ence such that {h ∈ H |hPihk} = {h ∈ H |hP ′
ihk}. Then,
• the set of cycles and paired-symmetric absorbing sets previous to the cycle
assigning hk to agent ai in the algorithm deﬁning ϕ≻(P−i,Pi) is also in
the algorithm deﬁning ϕ≻(P−i,P ′
i), and
15• (ii) Each agent participates in the same sequence of temporal assignments
in the algorithm deﬁning ϕ≻(P−i,Pi) until agent ai is assigned to hk as
in the ﬁrst v stages of the algorithm deﬁning ϕ≻(P−i,P ′
i).
Proof. Consider that hk and ai enter in a selected cycle of the algorithm
deﬁning ϕ≻(P−i,Pi) in stage q.
Let t = 1 be the ﬁrst step of the algorithm and let G1(P−i,Pi) be the graph
associated with this step when agent ai declares Pi. Suppose that q > 1 (if
not, the proof is ﬁnished). Notice that the paired-symmetric absorbing sets in
G≻
1 (P−i,Pi) (the digraph in step 1) are also in G≻
1 (P−i,P ′
i). Let C∞ denote
the set of cycles obtained by the algorithm at the end of this step and let cj =
{a1,h2,a2,h3,...,h1} be a cycle in C∞. Now consider G≻
1 (P−i,P ′
i). Notice that
every agent in cj is in this graph pointing to the same houses as in G≻
1 (P−i,Pi)
(given that ai  ∈ cj). (a) If cj is in an absorbing set in G≻
1 (P−i,P ′
i), then the
same structure of priorities is used to select an arrow from each agent of cj in
G≻
1 (P−i,Pi) and in G≻
1 (P−i,P ′
i). Hence cj is also obtained as a cycle in the ﬁrst
step of the algorithm for (P−1,P ′
i). (b) If not, all agents and houses in cj will
enter ﬁrstly in an absorbing set (the same absorbing set for all of them) in the
same stage, of the algorithm. Then, in this stage, say stage t, the structure of
priorities gives the same result as in G≻
1 (P−i,Pi) and then the cycle cj is also
obtained in G≻
t (P−i,P ′
i) and this is the ﬁrst cycle in which agents in ci enter.
Consider now t = 2 (assume that q > 2, if not, the proof is ﬁnished) and
let G≻
2 (P−i,Pi) be the graph associated with this step when agent ai declares
Pi. Consider any paired-symmetric absorbing set, Ai, in this graph. It is easy
to verify that every arrow from an agent in Ai to any house outside Ai in
G≻
1 (P−i,Pi) are not in G≻
2 (P−i,Pi). This happens because these houses belong
to a paired-symmetric absorbing set in G≻
1 (P−i,Pi). Then, every arrow from
an agent in Ai in G≻
2 (P−i,Pi) are the same as in G≻
2 (P−i,P ′
i) and in the sub-




i) are the same). Consider now a house hi ∈ Ai. If hi points
to its original owner in Ai, it also points to her in G≻
2 (P−i,P ′
i) and the sub-
sequent stages. If hi points to an agent aj diﬀerent from her original owner,
it must belong to a cycle cj obtained in G≻
1 (P−i,Pi). Then, by the previous
reasoning, we know that cj will also be obtained in G≻
t (P−i,P ′
i) for some t.
Therefore, we obtain that the paired-symmetric absorbing sets Ai will be ob-
tained in G≻
t∗+1(P−i,P ′
i) (being t∗ the later stage in which a house in Ai has
entered in its corresponding cycle8). And, therefore, the sequence of temporal
assignments that has received each of these agents are the same in both cases.
Consider now a cycle cj = {a1,h2,a2,h3,...,h1} in G≻
2 (P−1,Pi). In cj there
may be (only) three types of agents: (i) Those agents that have not entered
in a selected cycle in the ﬁrst stage in G≻
1 (P−i,Pi) and point to some houses
that are not present in G≻
2 (P−i,P ′
i). (ii) Those agents that have not entered in
a selected cycle in the ﬁrst stage and do not belong to (i). (iii) Those agents
that have entered in a selected cycle in the ﬁrst stage. The houses that have
8If all of them point to their original owner, t∗ = 1
16disappeared in the ﬁrst stage are the same in G≻
1 (P−i,Pi) and in G≻
1 (P−i,P ′
i)
because the paired-symmetric absorbing sets are the same in both graphs (as
we have proven above). Therefore, the agents in (i) point to the same houses
in G≻
2 (P−i,Pi) and in G≻
2 (P−i,P ′
i) (and in the probably subsequent stages).




i). To respect to those agents in (iii), they point to all their
maximal houses in G≻
2 (P−i,Pi). We know that the cycle that each of them
formed in the stage 1 of (P−i,Pi) is also formed in some stage t of (P−i,Pi). Let
t∗ be the later stage in which one of the cycles is formed (t∗ = 1 if this set is
empty). With respect to the houses of cj, it is easy to verify that they point to
the same agent in G≻







9. Then we also have that there exists ˆ t ≥ t∗ + 1 such that
G≻
2 (P−i,Pi)|cj = G≻
t∗+1(P−i,P ′
i)|cj and cj belongs to some absorbing set in
both graphs. Given that cj is formed in G≻
2 (P−i,Pi), we can deduce that the
house (hj) that each agent (aj) in cj receives temporarily in this stage is the
house with the highest priority between her maximal remaining houses. It is
possible that in G≻
ˆ t (P−i,P ′
i) the set of maximal remaining houses of each agent
is a proper subset of that in G≻
2 (P−i,Pi) but hj+1 is still present and, therefore,
must be the house with the highest priority. Then ci is also formed in stage ˆ t
and the sequence of temporal assignments that has received each of these agents
are the same in both cases.
When t ∈ {3,...,q}, the proof is similar. Therefore, we have proved both
parts of the lemma and v will correspond with the maximum of all ˆ t that will
appear in the proof of all stages of the algorithm after ai and hk enter in a cycle.
Now, we prove that if when an individual attains a utility level declaring a
preference, then there exist a house that gives this individual the same utility
such that if the individual puts it as her maximal house, she will receive it by
the algorithm.
Lemma 3 Let Ui(ϕ≻
i (P−i,Pi)) = k, then there exists a house hj such that
Ui(hj) = k and ϕ≻
i (P−i,P ′
i) = hj for all P ′
i with max(R′
i) = hj.
Proof. Let hj be the ﬁrst house assigned temporarily to agent ai by the TTAS
algorithm for (P−i,Pi) when the priority ranking is ≻. Notice that by Corollary
7, Ui(hj) = Ui(ϕ≻
i (P−i,Pi) = k. By Lemma 2, we have that the absorbing set
of agent ai in the graph corresponding to the stage q of the algorithm in which
hj is assigned to ai when she declares Pi is the same as the absorbing set of
agent ai in the graph corresponding to the stage v of the algorithm when she
declares P ′
i. Additionally, we know that each agent has passed from the same
sequence of temporal assignments in both algorithms until these steps. Then, if
the priority criterion has selected the cycle in which hj is assingmed ai when she
declares Pi, the priority criterion has to select also this cycle when she declares
9If G is a graph and c is a set of nodes of G, we denote by G|c the restricted graph that
includes only the nodes of c and the arrows that part from a node of c and arrive at a node
of c.
17P ′
i. Given that max(R′
i) = hj, we have by Corollary 7 that ϕ≻
i (P−i,P ′
i) = hj.
Now, we can prove the theorem. By Lemma 3, we have that if there is
any way of obtaining a particular level of utility, it is also possible to obtain
this level declaring any preference in which the maximal house is one of the
houses (hk) that gives you this utility. Consider in particular a ranking P ′
i in
which hk is the unique maximal house, hkPiϕi(P−i,Pi) and {h ∈ H |hPihk} =
{h ∈ H |hP ′
ihk}. Then, by Lemma 2, we have that the set of cycles and
paired-symmetric absorbing sets that have been formed when she declares Pi
before obtaining ϕ≻
i (P−i,Pi) are also formed when she declares P ′
i. Then, in
particular, we know that hk has belonged to a paired-symmetric absorbing set
and has leaved the algorithm with an agent diﬀerent from ai when ai declares
Pi. Therefore, hk has also leaved the algorithm with this diﬀerent agent when
ai declares P ′
i. Then, it is impossible for ai to obtain a better house than
ϕ≻
i (P−i,Pi) and the theorem is proved.
Proof of Theorem 6
Consider a housing market problem (N,H,ω,R) with a non-empty strict core.
We need to introduce an algorithm, called Top Trading Segmentation (hereafter,
TTS) originally proposed by Quint and Wako (2004) to determine a partition
of the set of agents and houses.
Step 1: Let each agent point to her maximal houses and each house point
to its owner. Select the absorbing sets of this digraph. Each absorbing set
constitutes an element of the partition.
Step i: Let each agent point to her maximal houses among the remaining
ones and each remaining house point to its owner. Select the absorbing sets of
this digraph. Each absorbing set constitutes an element of the partition.
With the partition obtained with the algorithm, Quint and Wako (2004)
proved that the following statements are equivalent:
• In each element of the partition, it is possible to ﬁnd a sub-allocation that
assigns to each agent one of their maximal houses in this set.
• The strict core of the problem is non-empty and one of the allocations of
it consists of the union of all these sub-allocations.
Now, we will prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Consider a digraph (V,E) such that V is an absorbing set. Then,
we can partition V in a set of disjoint cycles if and only if there exists a subset
E′ ⊆ E such that in the digraph (V,E′) all nodes have indegree and outdegree
equal to 1.







mi)}i∈{1,...,k} . Then, construct E′ in the following way:
(x,y) ∈ E′ if and only if [x = ai
j and y = hi
j+1] or [x = hi
j and y = ai
j] for some
i ∈ {1,...,k} and j ∈ {1,...,mi}. Then, it is easy to see that in (V,E′) all
nodes have indegree and outdegree equal to 1.
Assume now that there exists a subset E′ ⊆ E such that in the digraph
(V,E′) all nodes have indegree and outdegree equal to 1. Then, start with any
node of the digraph as the ﬁrst node of a cycle. Then, continue with the unique
sequence of edges (given that the outdegree of all nodes is 1) that part from
this node. Given that the indegree of all nodes is equal to 1, this sequence will
terminate in the initial node in some moment. Then, this sequence is the ﬁrst
cycle of the partition. Starting with other node that does not belong to this
cycle, we will construct other cycle, disjoint from the ﬁrst one. Finally, following
this procedure, we will have a partition of V in a set of disjoint cycles.
Then, consider any absorbing set of the ﬁrst step of the TTAS algorithm.
Note that this absorbing set is also one of the sets of the partition that TTS
determines. Then, given the result of Quint and Wako (2004), we have that
in a housing market problem with a non-empty strict core, the absorbing sets
determined in step 1 of the TTAS algorithm must have a partition in disjoint
cycles. Or, equivalently, using Lemma 4, in each of these absorbing sets we can
ﬁnd a subset of edges such that the indegree and outdegree of each of these
nodes is equal to 1.
If the absorbing set is paired-symmetric, our algorithm gives to each agent
in step (1.2) one of her maximal houses. Given Corollary 7, we deduce that our
mechanism allocates to these individuals one of their maximal houses.
If the absorbing set is non paired-symmetric, our algorithm applies in step
(1.3) a priority ranking ≻ to determine only one edge for each node of the
absorbing set, and in step (1.4), the resulting cycles trade provisionaly their
houses. If the priority ranking chooses exactly the edges that determine the
partition in cycles of the strict core allocation, we will have that all individuals
of the absorbing set will attain provisionally one of their maximal houses. Given
Corollary 7, we deduce that our mechanism allocates to these individuals one
of their maximal houses.
If, however, the priority ranking chooses other diﬀerent edges, we need to
prove that in the second step of the algorithm we have that the same agents
belong to a partition of absorbing sets such that we can ﬁnd a subset of edges
such that the indegree and outdegree of each of these nodes is equal to 1. Given
that this condition is satisﬁed in the step 1, we are going to construct a function
that assigns, for each of the edges belonging to this subset in step 1, an edge
in the step 2. First, for each edge from an agent to a house, consider exactly
the same edge in step 2. Second, for the edges from houses to agents, select
the unique edge that part from each house in step 2. Now, we will prove that
taking into account these edges, the nodes will have indegree and outdegree
equal to 1. Given that we have selected only one edge starting from any node,
19the outdegree is equal to 1 in all nodes. To see why the indegree is also equal
to 1, consider ﬁrst the nodes of the agents. In this nodes, only the house that
in this moment belong to this individual points to, and, then, the indegree is
equal to 1. Consider now the nodes of the houses. Given that we have selected
the same edges that in step 1 of the algorithm and the condition was satisﬁed
then, we have that the indegree is here also equal to 1 for any node.
Finally, if the condition is satisﬁed for all the absorbing sets determined in
step 1 of the TTAS algorithm, it is easy to see that the other sets of the partition
obtained by the TTS algorithm will appear in subsequent steps of the TTAS
algorithm and the same reasoning applies. Therefore, the theorem is proved.
References
[1] Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sonmez (1999) House Allocation with
Existing Tenants. Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 233-260.
[2] Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sonmez (2003) School Choice: A Mech-
anism Design Approach. American Economic Review, 93, 729-747.
[3] Gale, David and Lloyd Shapley (1962) College Admissions and the Stability
of Marriage. American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15.
[4] Kalai, Ehud and David Schmeidler (1977) An Admissible Set Occurring in
Various Bargaining Situations. Journal of Economic Theory, 14, 402-411.
[5] Ma, Jinpeng (1994) Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market
with Indivisibilities. International Journal of Game Theory, 23, 75-83.
[6] Quint, Thomas and Jun Wako (2004) On Houseswapping, the Strict Core,
Segmentation, and Linear Programming. Mathematics of Operations Re-
search, 29, 861-877.
[7] Roth, Alvin E. (1982) Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisi-
bilities. Economics Letters, 9, 127-132.
[8] Roth, Alvin E. and Andrew Postlewaite (1977) Weak versus Strong Domi-
nation in a Market with Indivisible Goods. Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, 4, 131-137.
[9] Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez, and M. Utku Unver (2004) Kidney Ex-
change. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 457-488.
[10] Shapley, Lloyd and Herbert Scarf (1974) On Cores and Indivisibility. Jour-
nal of Mathematical Economics 1, 23-28.
[11] Yilmaz, Ozgur (2009) Random Assignment under Weak Preferences.
Games and Economic Behavior, 65, 546-558.
20Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2009/23.  Helmuth  CREMER,  Philippe  DE  DONDER  and  Pierre  PESTIEAU.  Education  and  social 
mobility. 
2009/24.  Maria Eugenia SANIN and Francesco VIOLANTE. Understanding volatility dynamics in the 
EU-ETS market: lessons from the future. 
2009/25.  Marco DI SUMMA and Laurence A. WOLSEY. Lot-sizing with stock upper bounds and fixed 
charges. 
2009/26.  Johanna M.M. GOERTZ and François MANIQUET. On the informational efficiency of simple 
scoring rules. 
2009/27.  Jean  GABSZEWICZ,  Ornella  TAROLA  and  Skerdilajda  ZANAJ.  On  uncertainty  when  it 
affects successive markets. 
2009/28.  Jerzy  A.  FILAR,  Jacek  B.  KRAWCZYK  and  Manju  AGRAWAL.  On  production  and 
abatement time scales in sustainable development. Can we loosen the sustainability screw ? 
2009/29.  María Eugenia SANIN and Skerdilajda ZANAJ. Clean technology adoption and its influence on 
tradeable emission permit prices. 
2009/30.  Antoine BOMMIER, Marie-Louise LEROUX and Jean-Marie LOZACHMEUR. On the public 
economics of annuities with differential mortality. 
2009/31.  Gilles GRANDJEAN, Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Connections among 
farsighted agents. 
2009/32.  Axel GAUTIER and Xavier WAUTHY. On the nature of price competition under universal 
service obligations: a note. 
2009/33.  Santanu S. DEY and Laurence A. WOLSEY. Constrained infinite group relaxations of MIPs. 
2009/34.  Jean-François  MAYSTADT  and  Philip  VERWIMP.  Winners  and  losers  among  a  refugee-
hosting population. 
2009/35.  Pierre DEHEZ. Allocation of fixed costs and the weighted Shapley value. 
2009/36.  Sabien  DOBBELAERE,  Roland  Iwan  LUTTENS  and  Bettina  PETERS.  Starting  an  R&D 
project under uncertainty. 
2009/37.  Carlotta BALESTRA and Davide DOTTORI. Aging society, health and the environment. 
2009/38.  Alain  PHOLO  BALA.  Urban  concentration  and  economic  growth:  checking  for  specific 
regional effects. 
2009/39.  Alain PHOLO BALA. Gates, hubs and urban primacy in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
2009/40.  Nicolas BOCCARD. On efficiency, concentration and welfare. 
2009/41.  Taoufik  BOUEZMARNI,  Jeroen  V.K.  ROMBOUTS  and  Abderrahim  TAAMOUTI.  A 
nonparametric  copula  based  test  for  conditional  independence  with  applications  to  Granger 
causality. 
2009/42.  Josez  KONINGS  and  Hylke  VANDENBUSSCHE.  Antidumping  protection  hurts  exporters: 
firm-level evidence from France. 
2009/43.  Pierre PESTIEAU and Uri M. POSSEN. Retirement as a hedge. 
2009/44.  Santanu S. DEY and Laurence A. WOLSEY. Lifting group inequalities and an application to 
mixing inequalities. 
2009/45.  Jean CAVAILHES, Pierre FRANKHAUSER, Dominique PEETERS and Isabelle THOMAS. 
Residential equilibrium in a multifractal metropolitan area. 
2009/46.  Daisuke OYAMA, Yasuhiro SATO, Takatoshi TABUCHI and Jacques-François THISSE. On 
the impact of trade on industrial structures: The role of entry cost heterogeneity. 
2009/47.  Ken-Ichi SHIMOMURA and Jacques-François THISSE. Competition among the big and the 
small. 
2009/48.  Frédéric BABONNEAU, Yurii NESTEROV and Jean-Philippe VIAL. Design and operations of 
gas transmission networks. 
2009/49.  Olivier BOS. How lotteries outperform auctions for charity. 
2009/50.  Nicolas BOCCARD and Xavier WAUTHY. Entry accommodation under multiple commitment 
strategies: judo economics revisited. 
 Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2009/51.  Joachim GAHUNGU and Yves SMEERS. Multi-assets real options. 
2009/52.  Nicolas BOCCARD and Xavier WAUTHY. Regulating quality by regulating quantity: a case 
against minimum quality standards. 
2009/53.  David DE LA CROIX and Frédéric DOCQUIER. An incentive mechanism to break the low-
skill immigration deadlock. 
2009/54.  Henry TULKENS and Vincent VAN STEENBERGHE. "Mitigation, adaptation, suffering": In 
search of the right mix in the face of climate change. 
2009/55.  Santanu S. DEY and Quentin LOUVEAUX. Split rank of triangle and quadrilateral inequalities. 
2009/56.  Claire DUJARDIN, Dominique PEETERS and Isabelle THOMAS. Neighbourhood effects and 
endogeneity issues. 
2009/57.  Marie-Louise LEROUX, Pierre PESTIEAU and Maria RACIONERO. Voting on pensions: sex 
and marriage. 
2009/58.  Jean J. GABSZEWICZ. A note on price competition in product differentiation models. 
2009/59.  Olivier BOS and Martin RANGER. All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards. 
2009/60.  Julio DAVILA and Marie-Louise LEROUX. On the fiscal treatment of life expectancy related 
choices.  
2009/61.  Luc  BAUWENS  and  Jeroen  V.K.  ROMBOUTS.  On  marginal  likelihood  computation  in 
change-point models. 
2009/62.  Jorge ALCALDE-UNZU and Elena MOLIS. Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: 




Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition: 22 selected papers in public economics by 
Henry Tulkens, edited and introduced by Parkash Chander, Jacques Drèze, C. Knox Lovell and 
Jack Mintz, Springer, Boston 2006 (588 pp.). 
V.  GINSBURGH  and  D.  THROSBY  (eds.)  (2006),  Handbook  of  the  economics  of  art  and  culture. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
J. GABSZEWICZ (ed.) (2006), La différenciation des produits. Paris, La découverte. 
L. BAUWENS, W. POHLMEIER and D. VEREDAS (eds.) (2008), High frequency financial econometrics: 
recent developments. Heidelberg, Physica-Verlag. 
P. VAN HENTENRYCKE and L. WOLSEY (eds.) (2007), Integration of AI and OR techniques in constraint 
programming for combinatorial optimization problems. Berlin, Springer. 
P-P.  COMBES,  Th.  MAYER  and  J-F.  THISSE  (eds.)  (2008),  Economic  geography:  the  integration  of 
regions and nations. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS (ed.) (2008), Au-delà de Copernic: de la confusion au consensus ? Brussels, Academic and 
Scientific Publishers. 
J-M. HURIOT and J-F. THISSE (eds) (2009), Economics of cities. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
C. GOURIÉROUX and A. MONFORT (1995), Simulation Based Econometric Methods. 
A. RUBINSTEIN (1996), Lectures on Modeling Bounded Rationality. 
J. RENEGAR (1999), A Mathematical View of Interior-Point Methods in Convex Optimization. 
B.D.  BERNHEIM  and  M.D.  WHINSTON  (1999),  Anticompetitive  Exclusion  and  Foreclosure  Through 
Vertical Agreements. 
D.  BIENSTOCK  (2001),  Potential  function  methods  for  approximately  solving  linear  programming 
problems: theory and practice. 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 